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Summary
In response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001,
the Congress passed legislation, S.J.Res. 23, on September 14, 2001, authorizing the
President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons....”  The President signed this legislation into law on September 18, 2001
(P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)).  This report provides a legislative history of this
statute, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF), which, as Congress
stated in its text, constitutes the legislative authorization for the use of U.S. military
force contemplated by the War Powers Resolution.  It also is the statute which the
President and his attorneys have subsequently cited as an authority for him to engage in
electronic surveillance against possible terrorists without obtaining authorization of the
special Court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as
amended.  This report will only be updated if events warrant.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists linked to Islamic militant Usama bin Laden
hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners, crashing two into the twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City, and another into the Pentagon building in Arlington,
Virginia.  The fourth plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh, after
passengers struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft. The collective death
toll resulting from these incidents was nearly 3,000.  President George W. Bush
characterized these attacks as more than acts of terror.  “They were acts of war,” he said.
He added that “freedom and democracy are under attack,” and he asserted that the United
States would use “all of our resources to conquer this enemy.”1
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In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the President consulted with
the leaders of Congress on appropriate steps to take to deal with the situation confronting
the United States. These discussions produced the concept of a joint resolution of the
Congress authorizing the President to take military steps to deal with the parties
responsible for the attacks on the United States.  The leaders of the Senate and the House
decided at the outset that the discussions and negotiations with the President and White
House officials over the specific language of the joint resolution would be conducted by
them, and not through the formal committee legislation review process.2  Consequently,
no formal reports on this legislation were made by any committee of either the House or
the Senate.  As a result, it is necessary to rely on the texts of the original draft proposal
by the President for a use of military force resolution, and the final bill, S.J.Res. 23, as
enacted, together with the public statements of those involved in drafting the bill, to
construct the legislative history of this statute.  Between September 12 and 14, 2001, draft
language of a joint resolution was discussed and negotiated by the White House Counsel’s
Office, and the Senate and House leaders of both parties.  Other members of both Houses
of Congress suggested language for consideration through their respective party leaders.3
On Wednesday, September 12, 2001, the White House gave a draft joint resolution
to the leaders of the Senate and the House.  This White House draft legislation, if it had
been enacted, would have authorized the President (1) to take military action against those
involved in some notable way with the September 11 attacks on the U.S., but it also
would have granted him (2) statutory authority “to deter and pre-empt any future acts of
terrorism or aggression against the United States.”4 This language would have seemingly
authorized the President, without durational limitation, and at his sole discretion, to take
military action against any nation, terrorist group or individuals in the world without
having to seek further authority from the Congress.  It would have granted the President
open-ended authority to act against all terrorism and terrorists or potential aggressors
against the United States anywhere, not just the authority to act against the terrorists
involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and those nations, organizations and persons
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who had aided or harbored the terrorists.  As a consequence, this portion of the language
in the proposed White House draft resolution was strongly opposed by key legislators in
Congress and was not included in the final version of the legislation that was passed.
The floor debates in the Senate and House on S.J.Res. 23 make clear that the focus
of the military force legislation was on the extent of the authorization that Congress
would provide to the President for use of U.S. military force against the international
terrorists who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001and those who directly and
materially assisted them in carrying out their actions.  The language of the enacted
legislation, on its face, makes clear — especially in contrast to the White House’s draft
joint resolution of September 12, 2001 — the degree to which Congress limited the scope
of the President’s authorization to use U.S. military force through P.L. 107-40 to military
actions against only those international terrorists and other parties directly involved in
aiding or materially supporting the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.  The
authorization was not framed in terms of use of military action against terrorists generally.
On Friday, September 14, 2001, after the conclusion of the meetings of their
respective party caucuses from 9:15 a.m. to 10:15 a.m., where the final text of the draft
bill was discussed, S.J. Res. 23, jointly sponsored by Senators Thomas Daschle and Trent
Lott, the Senate Majority and Minority leaders respectively, was called up for quick
consideration under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement. S.J.Res. 23 was then
considered and passed by the Senate by a vote of 98-0.5  As part of the Senate’s
unanimous consent agreement that set the stage for the  rapid consideration and vote on
S.J.Res. 23, the Senate agreed to adjourn and to have no additional votes until after the
following Wednesday.  That action effectively meant that if the House amended S.J.Res.
23, no further legislative action on it would occur until the middle of the following week.
After the House of Representatives received S.J.Res. 23 from the Senate, on Friday,
September 14, 2001, the House  passed it late that evening, after several hours of debate,
by a vote of 420-1, clearing it for the President.  Prior to passing S.J.Res. 23,  the House
considered, and then tabled an identically worded joint resolution, H.J.Res. 64, and
rejected a motion to recommit by Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.), that would have had the
effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report from the President on his actions under
the joint resolution every 60 days after it entered into force.
S.J.Res. 23, formally titled in Section 1 as the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force,” was thus passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, and was signed into law by
the President on September 18, 2001.6  The enacted bill contains five “Whereas clauses”
in its preamble, expressing opinions regarding why the joint resolution is necessary.  Four
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of these are identical to the “Whereas clauses” contained in the White House draft joint
resolution of September 12, 2001.  The fifth, which was not in the original White House
draft, reads as follows: “Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to
take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States....” This statement, and all of the other Whereas clauses in P.L. 107-40, are not part
of the language after the Resolving clause of the Act, and, as such, it is not clear how a
Court would treat such provisions in interpreting the scope of the authority granted in the
law.7 
Section 2(a) of the joint resolution,  authorizes the President “to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.”  The joint resolution further states, in Section 2(b)(1), Congressional intent that
it  “constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution.”  Finally, Section 2(b)(2) of the joint resolution states that
“[n]othing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”
A notable feature of S.J.Res. 23 is that unlike all other major legislation authorizing
the use of military force by the President, this joint resolution authorizes military force
against “organizations and persons” linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States.  In its past authorizations for use of U.S. military force, Congress has
permitted action against unnamed nations in specific regions of the world, or against
named individual nations, but never against “organizations or persons.”  The authorization
of use of force against unnamed nations is consistent with some previous instances where
authority was given to act against unnamed states when they became aggressors or took
military action against the United States or its citizens.8
President George W. Bush in signing S.J.Res. 23 into law on September 18, 2001,
noted the Congress had acted “wisely, decisively, and in the finest traditions of our
country.”  He thanked the “leadership of both Houses for their role in expeditiously
passing this historic joint resolution.”  He noted that he had had the “benefit of
meaningful consultations with members of the Congress” since the September 11 attacks,
and that he would “continue to consult closely with them as our Nation responds to this
threat to our peace and security.” President Bush also asserted that S.J.Res. 23
“recognized the authority of the President under the Constitution to take action to deter
and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States.”  He also stated that “In signing
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this resolution, I maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the
President’s constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United
States and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.”9 
It is important to note here that Presidents frequently sign bills into law that contain
provisions or language with which they disagree.  Presidents sometimes draw attention
to these disagreements in a formal statement at the time they sign a bill into law.  While
Presidential “signing statements” may indicate that the President views certain provisions
to be unconstitutional, they do not themselves have the force of law, nor do they modify
the language of the enacted statute.   Should the President strongly object to the language
of any bill presented to him, he has the option to veto it, and compel the Congress to enact
it through voting to override his veto.  Once a bill is enacted into law, however, every
President, in accordance with Article II, section 3 of the U.S. Constitution,  is obligated
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed....”  Thus, unless its current  language,
is changed through enactment of a new statute that amends it, or its effect is modified by
opinions of the Federal Courts, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” statute,  
P.L. 107-40,  retains the legal force it has had since its enactment on September 18, 2001.
———————————————————————————————————
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Joint Resolution
 To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent
attacks launched against the United States.
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United
States and its citizens; and
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its
rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States
posed by these grave acts of violence; and
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States,
Now, therefore be it
 Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled — 
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That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned,
authorized, harbored, committed, or aided in the planning or commission
of the attacks against the United States that occurred on September 11,
2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression
against the United States.
———————————————————————————————————
Text of S.J. Res. 23 as passed September 14, 2001, and signed into law11
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent
attacks launched against the United States. 
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United
States and its citizens; 
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its
rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; 
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States
posed by these grave acts of violence; 
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States; and 
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent
acts of international terrorism against the United States; Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the “Authorization for Use of Military Force.”
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) IN GENERAL. — That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS — 
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION — Consistent with section 8(a)(1)
of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this resolution
supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
 
